Rationality, Time, and Self by Olley (F.O.C.H.) Pearson

Rationality, Time, and Self by Olley (F.O.C.H.) Pearson

Author:Olley (F.O.C.H.) Pearson
Language: eng
Format: epub, pdf
Publisher: Springer International Publishing, Cham


6.6 Summary

The only rational obligations on an agent are those provided by j-reasons. In paradigm cases an agent will be aware of what there is most reason to do and the agent will do that thing for those reasons. However, an agent can be mistaken about what reasons obtain. When an agent is mistaken about this that agent can still qualify as rational. The agent will not qualify as rational because the agent does as the agent ought to or because the agent fulfils a CNR . The agent will qualify as rational because the agent acts in a way sufficiently close to the paradigm case. Specifically, because the agent has a network of beliefs and goal giving desires which would be isomorphic with the network of reasons and the actions they are reasons for if the agent’s beliefs about what reasons obtained were true. From the agent’s perspective the rational thing to do will always appear to be the thing that the agent ought to do. Though a third party can see that in error cases what it is rational for an agent to do and what they ought to do, or the actions that they have reasons to perform, can be distinct. But, error cases and paradigm cases will always be similar in a way that shows the rationality of the former derives from the reasonableness of the latter. This links back to the account of acting for a reason given in the last chapter where it was shown that to act for a reason involves an agent having a belief and a desire which gives the agent’s goal. Because this belief and desire are of import to acting for a reason, and hence to the paradigm cases of acting rationally, the beliefs and desires of an agent can also be of import to whether or not other actions qualify as rational.

Before closing I will say how this fits with the use made of CNRs in Chap. 4. There I referred to two apparent CNRs : one ought if one believes one’s mother unwell, to call around to see her; and, one ought if one desires to make a cake, to gather ingredients. The former of these is a specification of CNR1. The point at issue is that one’s mother being unwell is a reason to call to see her, one believes that reason to obtain, and so one ought to have a goal giving desire to go around to see her. As such the best thing to say is that, if Si (the agent at issue) is mistaken in believing his mother unwell, he is irrational for not going around to see her. But, this does not mean that he ought to go around to see her. Rather, because she is well Si should carry on home to his children. The second CNR is a specification of CNR2. Gathering ingredients is a means to making a cake. An agent with the goal of making a cake is



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